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DELIMITING THE CULTURE DEFENSE
James M. Donovan & John Stuart Garth
I. INTRODUCTION
The culture defense-the claim that, when ascertaining guilt or
setting penalties, courts should consider relevant features of a
defendant's cultural background-arises inconsistently during both
criminal and civil proceedings. Some judges rule the argument
extraneous to the issues at bar, while other judges confronting similar
facts may find the culture defense relevant to the case.' The array of
cases in which the culture defense can arise is illustrated in the Appendix
below. In trials dealing with subjects ranging from homicide to child
abuse, and from marriage to clothing, persons outside the dominant
traditions of society are frequently disadvantaged when attempting to
2
secure their rights. As the example decisions suggest, sometimes such
persons are allowed to assert the culture defense and sometimes they are
not.3  And while sometimes the denial may be comparatively
uncontroversial, at other times it can appall the sense of justice.4
An especially influential proponent of the promulgation of a formal
right to invoke a culture defense has been Alison Dundes Renteln:
5
1. E.g., Elaine Chiu, Culture as Justification, Not Excuse, 43 AM. CRIM. L. REV. 1317,
1321 (2006) ("The results for defendants have been spotty and inconsistent as the ability to
secure acquittals on the basis of culture or to offer cultural evidence at their trials has varied
wildly.").
2. Although it may be difficult to quantify the injustice experienced domestically by
cultural minorities, it is sobering to realize that, worldwide, one in seven persons are members
of groups that are disadvantaged or discriminated against due to their cultural identities.
UNITED NATIONS DEVELOPMENT PROGRAMME, HUMAN DEVELOPMENT REPORT 2004:
CULTURAL LIBERTY IN TODAY'S DIVERSE WORLD 31 (2004), available at
http://hdr.undp.org/en/media/hdr04_complete.pdf.
3. Compare, e.g., Nguyen v. State, 520 S.E.2d 907 (Ga. 1999) with People v. Croy,
710 P.2d 392 (Cal. 1985); see also infra Appendix.
4. Compare, e.g, Bhatia v. Chevron U.S.A., Inc., 734 F.2d 1382 (9th Cir. 1984) with In
re Jertrude 0., 466 A.2d 885 (Md. Ct. Spec. App. 1983); see also infra Appendix.
5. ALISON DUNDES RENTELN, THE CULTURAL DEFENSE (2004).
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[Courts] should consider cultural evidence in all cases. It should not be
excluded as irrelevant and should be admissible in the courtroom. Although I
contend that defendants should have the right to explain the motivations
behind their behavior, I do not think that all defendants should be exonerated.
6
To the extent that a right to one's own culture is recognized as
within a broader principle of basic human privileges (which is, as
Renteln concedes, an admittedly contested premise), that right "should
mean, at the very least, that individuals have the [opportunity] to present
evidence in court concerning traditions that are important for the
maintenance of their cultural identity."7 Explanations in terms of the
party's culture, however, should not be asserted without limit.8 In an
initial attempt to prevent the trivialization of this strategy, and to set a
reasonable minimal threshold for the invocation of the culture defense,
Renteln offers the following three-point culture defense test:
1. Is the litigant a member of the ethnic group?
2. Does the group have such a tradition as that claimed by the
litigant?
3. Was the litigant influenced by that tradition when he or she
acted?9
Although departing from Renteln's analysis in some of the details,' °
we agree, for reasons explained below, that evidence of cultural
background should be heard as a matter of standard procedure during
judicial proceedings. The goal of this essay is to address one obstacle to
that outcome: the fear that routine admissibility of cultural information
will lead to differing standards of accountability for different groups,
thus eroding the common societal expectations underlying the rule of
law. We conclude that a reformulated culture defense test is required.
6. Id. at 200.
7. Id. at 212.
8. Alison Dundes Renteln, The Use and Abuse of the Cultural Defense, 20 CAN. J.
LAW & Soc'Y 47, 54-56 (2005).
9. RENTELN, supra note 5, at 207.
10. For example, although Renteln does not see the variable of successive generations
as a relevant variable in weighing the influence of the culture defense, we will argue that
lifelong exposure to the normative expectations of the dominant society will diminish the
relevancy of a culture defense. Nor are we likely to be as confident as she that the
government should remain free to limit cultural traditions "that involve irreparable physical
harm," RENTELN, supra note 5, at 218, since the perception of "harm" is often the precise
attribute charged during the trial and rebutted by the defense. Harm, in other words, should
remain a question of fact and not of law.
QLR
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This revised test should balance the defendant's interest for a fair
hearing, specifically a defendant who is a member of a nondominant
culture group, with the interests of the dominant society to preserve a
legal system in which all parties are treated equally.
Renteln recognizes the need to impose some principled limitations
upon invocations of the culture defense."l Her own suggestions include
limiting the defense to "bona fide ethnic minority groups" while denying
it to "subcultures" which have more to do with class than with cultural
differences. 12 For the most part, however, Renteln asks questions about
possible limits rather than offering firm conclusions: should the culture
defense be limited to first-generation immigrants only; does it matter "if
the defendant is charged with violating a general law like assault or with
violating a law that specifically forbids the cultural practice"; and should
the culture defense "be allowed in cases where the victim is not from the
defendant's culture?
13
In contrast, our analysis concludes that more specific limitations
can be imposed upon the culture defense without detracting from the
justifications for its existence. Specifically, the culture defense is most
appropriate to acts that, in the original setting, are understood to advance
social rather than personal goals (this represents a limitation on the kinds
of actions for which the culture defense should be available), and is best
justified by litigants who presumptively cannot have known the
antisocial or criminal nature of the act they were committing (this
represents a limitation on the types of persons who should be allowed to
assert the culture defense). These requirements should be read as
additions to Renteln's three-point test described above. The net effect
we hope to achieve is a robust recognition of culture's role in individual
life, as well as a concession to the sociological fact of multiculturalism.
We favor imposing only those limits on the culture defense that are
required for an orderly rule of law, without venturing beyond to effect a
government-enforced comprehensive and homogeneous way of life
determined by the culturally dominant majority.
II. BACKGROUND JURISPRUDENTIAL ISSUES
We begin our discussion with terminological clarifications. The
culture defense broadly refers to the mitigation or negation of "criminal
11. Id.at207-10.
12. Id. at 207-08.
13. Id. at 208-09.
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responsibility where acts are committed under a reasonable, good-faith
belief in their propriety, based upon the actor's cultural heritage or
tradition."' 4  Although the culture defense most often arises in this
criminal context, the Appendix contains several cases which
demonstrate that the culture defense is also applicable in civil contexts,
such as family law and disputes over dress codes.
1 5
As characterized above by Taryn Goldstein,1 6 and as required by
the third element of Renteln's test, 7 the legitimate introduction of a
culture defense requires that the defendant have relied upon a positive,
normative rule from his own cultural background, rather than merely
having acted in ignorance of the dominant culture's laws (i.e., I must
have taken your apples not simply because I did not know they belonged
to you, but because in my culture the apples could not belong to you, and
we have an affirmative tradition of access to any apples we come
across). The distinction between behaving in conformity with different
cultural postulates, as opposed to acting out of ignorance of those of the
dominant society, thus emerges as central to the sustainability of the
culture defense as a separate legal concept. As underscored by Levine, it
is the reliance of the defendant upon his or her cultural background that
frames the central question of fact in the culture defense, inquiring into
the reasonableness and honesty of that reliance.
18
Although the usual terminology in the literature refers to the
"cultural defense," as reflected in the title of Renteln' s book, that label is
unnecessarily misleading. All defenses are intrinsically cultural in that
their embedded logic and presuppositions draw upon the shared
background of the referent group. 19 That is precisely why there is a need
for a "culture defense" which seeks to draw the court's attention to the
role of the defendant's nondominant culture in his decision to perform
the contested act. Otherwise, the suggestion is that only the distancing
14. Taryn F. Goldstein, Cultural Conflicts in Court: Should the American Criminal
Justice System Formally Recognize a "Cultural Defense"., 99 DICK. L. REV. 141, 143
(1994).
15. See, e.g., In re Marriage of Vryonis, 248 Cal. Rptr. 807 (Cal. Ct. App. 1988);
LOOC, Inc. v. Kohli, 701 A.2d 92 (Md. 1997); see also infra Appendix.
16. Goldstein, supra note 14, at 143.
17. RENTELN, supra note 5, at 207.
18. Kay L. Levine, Negotiating the Boundaries of Crime and Culture: A Sociolegal
Perspective on Cultural Defense Strategies, 28 LAW & SOC. INQUIRY 39,72 (2003).
19. See, e.g., Susan S. Kuo, Culture Clash: Teaching Cultural Defenses in the Criminal
Law Classroom, 48 ST. LOUIS U. L.J. 1297, 1308 (urging students to be "mindful of the
cultural assumptions contained in the cases they read").
QLR
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"they" have culture, immediately casting the argument against the
culture defense in a pejorative light.2°
In principle, the defense serves as a counterbalance to the cultural
presumptions of the majority, presumptions that are already embedded
as defaults within the legal system itself. The nuances of this claim are
better preserved by the use of the noun "culture" rather than the
adjective "cultural" to describe the defense, and, therefore, this essay
employs the more instructive phrase "culture defense" over the
prevailing but technically misleading "cultural defense."
As seen in the illustrative cases in the Appendix, culture defense
issues arise in both criminal and civil disputes. For didactic purposes,
however, our argument for the culture defense (and the principled
limitation of its application) emphasizes the role the defense plays in
criminal contexts. The injustice arising from its denial, as well as the
danger posed by its unchecked use, are both accentuated in the criminal
context, allowing easier identification of a principled middle course.2'
Within the criminal context, the judicial process aims to apportion
responsibility for the charged act (an outcome signified by the outcome
of the process in a determination of "guilty" or "not guilty"). This need
to ascertain "guilt" does not vary based on whether the criminal justice
system is rooted in retribution for criminal acts or rehabilitation of those
who commit the acts. In the first instance, punishment targets those
responsible for the misdeed, whether that responsibility is personal or
collective.22 In the second instance, one can only maximize social
welfare by changing the behavior of the specific persons who acted
antisocially. 23  Diminishing responsibility in either instance results in
20. See, e.g., SALLY ENGLE MERRY, HUMAN RIGHTS AND GENDER VIOLENCE:
TRANSLATING INTERNATIONAL LAW INTO LOCAL JUSTICE 101-02 (2006) ("For many
transnational elites, culture is far away. It is mostly located 'out there'-in villages,
mountains, deserts, deep forests, or among minority communities.").
21. The criminal context heightens the possibility of gross injustice not only because of
the liability for incarceration or worse, but also because the due process issues raised make
these controversies of constitutional significance. See James J. Sing, Note, Culture as
Sameness: Toward a Synthetic View of Provocation and Culture in the Criminal Law, 108
YALE L.J. 1845, 1883 (1999).
22. Elaborations on collective responsibility appear in Joel Feinberg, Collective
Responsibility, in RESPONSIBILITY 222 (Ellen Frankel Paul, Fred D. Miller, Jr., & Jeffrey Paul
eds., 1999) and J.R. LUCAS, RESPONSIBILITY 233 (1995). A theory of collective responsibility
can arguably render an entire polity liable for punishment for actions taken by the state in its
name. See KARL JASPERS, THE QUESTION OF GERMAN GUILT 31-32,61-73 (1947).
23. This "rehabilitative ideal" was responsible, in part, for the creation of our separate
juvenile court system, which sought to "address the individual needs of delinquent children,
provide care and rehabilitation, and ensure that they could go on to live lawful, productive
2007]
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reduced response by the state, albeit by different rationales.2 4  Justice
systems, then, however conceived, contain as an elemental task the
identification and allocation of responsibility for the offending acts.
The culture defense is useful in assigning responsibility for a
charged act. As one example, the American legal system typically
requires proof of a criminal defendant's culpable state of mind, or "mens
rea," in committing the charged deed.
Mens rea, or "guilty mind," marks a central distinguishing feature of criminal
law. An injury caused without mens rea might be grounds for civil liability but
typically not for criminal. Criminal liability requires not only causing a
prohibited harm or evil-the actus reus of an offense-but also a particular
state of mind with regard to causing that harm or evil.
25
In its most general sense, this term of art refers to the mindset of the
accused at the time he or she was allegedly committing the crime.26
Determining whether the accused possessed the requisite mens rea
usually involves the question of whether the act was committed
"purposely" or "knowingly., 27
Although the exact contours of the required cognitive state can be
imprecise, the main thrust of the problem can be seen in examples of
mistaken beliefs and accidents. If I knowingly and purposely burn down
my neighbor's home, the act would be deemed arson and I would be
liable for the accompanying criminal penalties. Should that outcome be
any different if (a) I knowingly and purposely bum down my neighbor's
home, in the belief that it is my own, or (b) I bum down my neighbor's
home, but accidentally-perhaps I lit a match near a gas main?
As Paul Robinson explains, modem charging (1) tends to speak in
terms of culpability rather than mens rea; (2) has identified four specific
levels of culpability: purposely, knowingly, recklessly, and negligently;
lives." Daniel M. Filler & Austin E. Smith, The New Rehabilitation, 91 IOWA L. REv. 951,
956 (2006).
24. See, e.g., Solem v. Helm, 463 U.S. 277, 284, 286 (1983) (holding that the Eighth
Amendment's ban on cruel and unusual punishments "prohibits . . . sentences that are
disproportionate to the crime committed," and that the "constitutional principle of
proportionality has been recognized explicitly in this Court for almost a century").
25. Paul Robinson, Mens Rea, in ENCYCLOPEDIA OF CRIME & JUSTICE 995, 995
(Joshua Dressier ed., 2d ed. 2002).
26. Id.
27. A compendium of common adverbial expansions of the "guilty mind" component is
available at WAYNE L. LAFAVE, CRIMINAL LAW 240 (4th ed. 2003).
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and (3) tends to assign to each element of a charged crime its own level
of required culpability. 28 Thus,
[if] the objective elements of an offense require that a person take the property
of another, the culpability elements might require, for example, that the person
know that she is taking property and that she is at least reckless as to it being
someone else's property. In each instance, and for each element of an offense,
the legislature may set the culpability level at the minimum they think
appropriate either to establish liability or to set off one grade of an offense
from another.
29
As the concept of the guilty mind is elaborated, we begin to see how
problems of cultural background emerge as a relevant variable for
consideration. For example, if the crime of theft requires some degree of
culpability as to the knowing taking of someone else's property, then it
becomes pertinent to ask what types of property are considered eligible
for private ownership within a given set of cultural precepts. If, due to
my cultural background, it never occurs to me that a specific individual
can own natural resources, then my eating apples from your tree might
fail to rise to an act of theft. The ubiquitous obviousness in American
culture of the opposite view matters not at all; it is what is in my mind
that becomes the relevant variable on such questions.
A common retort to this argument relies on some version of the
dictum that ignorance of the law is no excuse. 30 If the law is to function
as an effective means of social regulation, according to the argument,
there must be a general presumption of acquaintance with its
requirements. 3' Otherwise, the criminal justice system would be placed
in the absurd predicament of being able to punish only those who made a
good faith effort to learn and obey the law. The subjective knowledge of
a defendant, therefore, must be irrelevant to the determination of
responsibility and guilt within any system modeled upon the "rule of
law. ,, 32
28. Robinson, supra note 25, at 999.
29. Id. (emphasis in original).
30. This phrase is the modem version of Roman law's "ignorantia juris non excusat."
BLACK'S LAW DICTIONARY 762-63 (8th ed. 2004).
31. Thus classic philosophers from Aquinas, see THOMAS AQUINAS, SUMMA
THEOLOGICA, at Q.91, art.4 (1265), to Hegel, see GEORG W. F. HEGEL, ELEMENTS OF THE
PHILOSOPHY OF RIGHT § 215 (Allen W. Wood ed., 1991), point out the need for law to be
publicly promulgated before it can be binding on the citizens.
32. Kevin Jon Heller, Beyond the Reasonable Man? A Sympathetic but Critical
Assessment of the Use of Subjective Standards of Reasonableness
in Self-Defense and Provocation Cases, 26 AM. J. CRIM. L. 1, 9 (1998) ("Subjective standards
2007]
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In place of a subjective analysis, one might apply an "objective
test" that takes the point of view of an external observer of the
defendant. A prominent example of such an objective standard is the
"reasonable man."33 This touchstone is particularly appropriate given
that at least one legal anthropologist, Max Gluckman, offered the strong
(and contested) conclusion that the "reasonable man is recognized as the
central figure in all developed systems of law," 34 raising hopes that its
use would be culturally neutral.
Within this analysis, the defendant's state of mind and personal
beliefs are irrelevant.35 Instead, it becomes the idealized observer's state
of mind and personal beliefs that determine the outcome, with the
subjective opinions of the actor himself deemed inconsequential. What
would the generic society member have done, known, and felt under
circumstances similar to those that confronted the defendant? The
further the defendant has deviated from this stereotyped expectation, the
greater the perceived fault: he acted unreasonably.
One can easily see why Renteln would conclude that the "'objective
reasonable person' standard is culturally biased because it is simply the
,,36persona of the dominant legal culture, namely the Anglo-American.
The test is not "objective" at all, but merely the unreflective
presumptions of the cultural majority raised to the level of a legal duty.
The legal analysis differs little, if at all, from a mere culture-conformity
test: did the defendant behave in a way that an idealized, stereotypical
American would have behaved under like circumstances?
Unsurprisingly, the "reasonable man" standard has received an
onslaught of criticism. 37  Women in particular have argued that the
"reasonable man" is precisely that, a man, and therefore prejudices the
claims of females about reasonable behavior from their perspective.
38
of reasonableness are irreconcilable with the Rule of Law, in this view, because such
standards necessarily take into account 'the infinite varieties of temperament, intellect, and
education which make the internal character of a given act so different in different men."'
(quoting OLIVER WENDELL HOLMES, THE COMMON LAW 108 (1938))).
33. Id. at 8 ("The concept of the 'reasonable person' is at the heart of the objective
standard").
34. MAX GLUCKMAN, THE JUDICIAL PROCESS AMONG THE BAROTSE OF NORTHERN
RHODESIA 83 (2d ed. 1967).
35. Heller, supra note 32, at 9.
36. RENTELN, supra note 5, at 36.
37. E.g., V.F. Nourse, Upending Status: A Comment on Switching, Inequality, and the
Idea of the Reasonable Person, 2 OHIO ST. J. CRIM. LAW 361, 371 ("Would we really lose so
much if we were to eliminate the reasonable person?").
38. See FONA E. RArITr & M. SUZANNE ZEEDYK, THE IMPLICIT RELATION OF
QLR
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Although touted as a generic standard, the "reasonable man" is
intrinsically sexist, and not by accident.39 The cognitive ability to reason
has historically been withheld, erroneously, from the list of common
feminine attributes, earning women a significant amount of paternalistic
protection from the law "for their own good.
40
The above example demonstrates how legal systems have a perhaps
inevitable tendency to reify their own cultural assumptions, and to
objectify such concepts as being "normal," even "natural," thus
requiring adherence by all to such assumptions, regardless of a person's
background. For full members of the majority group, this heuristic may
even be roughly valid because it is those members, if anyone, who will
tend to hold the beliefs and understandings that the law projects onto
them. The difficulty here is not necessarily with the process of legal
rationalization, but its collision with other demands of a functioning
system of law.
The "reasonable man" is problematic not simply because the
standard disadvantages women, but also because it does so in violation
of its own internal logic. A fundamental component of the "rule of law"
is that it treats all similarly situated persons equally.41 The feature of the
rule of law of particular relevance to the present point is due process,
which affords individuals "a hearing before a neutral magistrate who
applies rules that in principle dispose of other, similar disputes. 42 By
that standard, if the law affords males the privilege of being judged
according to typical male behavior, then females deserve the right to be
evaluated according to a measure that reflects their own modal
tendencies.43 Thus, if members of the majority are judged by their own
PSYCHOLOGY AND LAW: WOMEN AND SYNDROME EVIDENCE 53 (2000) ("Male-normative
expectations permeate psychology and law. Yet they are well concealed, having acquired a
'point-of-viewlessness' that is masterly in it simplicity and efficiency.").
39. See, e.g., Ronald K.L. Collins, Language, History and the Legal Process: A Profile
of the "Reasonable Man," 8 RUTGERS-CAM. L.J. 311 (1977).
40. For this reason, for example, women for Aristotle were "'necessary deformities,' not
quite human." Stephen R. Clark, Is Humanity a Natural Kind, in WHAT IS AN ANIMAL? 17,
26 (Tim Ingold ed., Routledge 1994) (1988).
41. According to Miguel Schor, the "rule of law" has two primary elements, due
process and constitutional judicial review. Miguel Schor, Rule of Law, in 3 ENCYCLOPEDIA
OF LAW AND SOCIETY 1329, 1329-30 (David S. Clark ed., 2007).
42. Id. at 1330
43. Women are placed in an intolerable double bind, according to Fiona Raitt and
Suzanne Zeedyk. When considering the Premenstrual Syndrome defense, women "can either
be guilty or they can be crazy. They can be wicked or they can be controlled. But they cannot
be reasonable and autonomous, and they cannot engage in criminal or violent activity for
rational reasons, as men can." RAIrr & ZEEDYK, supra note 38, at 125. Would social chaos
2007]
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cultural standards, members of the minority should be entitled to have
their cultural standards considered as well. For the "litigants to be
treated equally under the law [they must be] treated differently." 44 A
refusal to at least consider such factors violates the minority's right to
culture as articulated, for example, in the International Covenant of Civil
and Political Rights.45 Moreover, such refusal undermines the majority's
justification for its social order as the fair rule of law based upon due
process for all, rather than a self-serving rule (quite literally) of men.
Assigning responsibility and culpability in light of a more nuanced
consideration of relevant background assumptions, such as race and
gender, has been gaining acceptance.46 This trend, however, does not
necessarily assure that courts will similarly entertain other potential
influences, such as cultural background. Still, the existence of those
other allowances makes that possibility less extraordinary. Allowing
that the general feasibility of a meaningful cultural defense can be
achieved through analogy with such precedents, the remaining
objections to its invocation would reduce to policy concerns specific to
its special details. The remainder of this essay attempts to address some
of these issues.
III. THE CULTURE DEFENSE
Renteln's rationale for the culture defense builds upon the
presumption "that culture shapes the identity of individuals, influencing
their reasoning, perceptions, and behavior. ''47  Because culturally
embedded predispositions run deep within a person's psyche, judicial
systems should take them into account either when apportioning
responsibility or determining punishment.48 The alternative, she argues,
truly ensue "if psychology characterized a woman's reaction to long-term battering or rape or
sexual abuse as normal?" Id. at 178.
44. RENTELN, supra note 5, at 16.
45. "In those States in which ethnic, religious or linguistic minorities exist, persons
belonging to such minorities shall not be denied the right, in community with the other
members of their group, to enjoy their own culture, to profess and practise their own religion,
or to use their own language." International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights art. 27,
Dec. 16, 1966, 999 U.N.T.S. 171.
46. See generally, e.g., CYNTHIA LEE, MURDER AND THE REASONABLE MAN: PASSION
AND FEAR IN THE CRIMINAL COURTROOM (2003).
47. RENTELN, supra note 5, at 10.
48. In her analysis Renteln includes cases that we suspect are more apt to cloud the
present conceptual issues concerning the culture defense than to illume them. Specifically,
she includes as instances involving the culture defense those raising issues relating to the
QLR
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is the enforcement of an ideology of complete assimilation of all who
come within U.S. borders.49
A few examples of actual cases should illustrate the potential
injustices to which Renteln is drawing our attention.
A. State v. Kargar
In State v. Kargar, a man originally from Afghanistan was charged
with "gross sexual assault" after he kissed the penis of his nine-month-
old son.50 Kargar admitted the action, but denied that this was a crime
within the meaning of the criminal statute under which he was charged.
Witnesses testified that such demonstrations were "considered neither
wrong nor sexual under Islamic law and that Kargar did not know his
action was illegal under Maine law.",5' Based on Maine's de minimis
statute, which allows the court to dismiss a case if "it finds the
defendant's conduct ... [presents] such other extenuations that it cannot
reasonably be regarded as envisaged by the Legislature in defining the
crime,"52 the Maine Supreme Court accepted Kargar's argument and
held that he was not guilty. 53 In this instance, the court accepted the
culture defense because, in part, Maine's legal scheme had a preexisting
category into which such arguments would fall.
B. People v. Moua
Renteln and Deirdre Evans-Prichard discuss an unreported 1985
case, People v. Moua, in which "Kong Moua, then twenty-three years
old, believed he was following Hmong customary marriage practices
when he engaged in sexual intercourse with Seng Xiong. But Seng
Xiong, then nineteen years old, apparently rejected this tradition" and
exercise of religion. While religion is indisputably a powerful cultural force, within our own
legal system disputes concerning religious beliefs (and to a much lesser extent, actions) relate
to a well-elaborated First Amendment jurisprudence far beyond any that would inform
litigation arising from other cultural practices. Because it may not be instructive to discuss
religious free exercise cases as ones illustrating culture defense problems, we have not
followed Renteln in that direction.
49. Id. at 6.
50. State v. Kargar, 679 A.2d 81, 82 (Me. 1996).
51. Nancy A. Wanderer & Catherine R. Connors, Culture and Crime: Kargar and the
Existing Frameworkfor a Cultural Defense, 47 BUFF. L. REV. 829, 838 (1999).
52. Id. at 837; see also ME. REV. STAT. ANN. tit. 17-A, § 12 (2006).
53. Id. at 837.
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alleged that she had been raped.54 Both parties were born and raised in
Laos, and immigrated to the United States after reaching their teens.55
Moua's rape charge was complicated by the Hmong practice of
"marriage by capture," whereby "the man is required to take the woman
to his family home and keep her there for three days in order to
consummate the marriage. The woman is supposed to protest, 'No, no,
no, I'm not ready,' to prove her virtue. 56 To the external observer, the
marriage ritual would be indiscernible from an actual sexual assault.57
The criminal justice problem grows more complex with the
realization that Hmong rape, to the extent the Hmong have an equivalent
concept, refers to sex with a classificatory inappropriate woman rather
than sex with a woman who withholds her consent.58 This raises the
question whether, had Moua believed Xiong's protests to be sincere, he
would have realized he was doing something wrong. That ethnographic
datum certainly brings into doubt that he knew he was committing the
act of rape as defined by American law.
In this case, Moua was sentenced to three months in jail and fined
one thousand dollars, nine hundred of which were given to Xiong as
"reparation. 59 Underscoring the apparent reasonableness of this plea-
bargained result were the additional details that Xiong "did not report
the incident to the police right away, and later, when she did, told them
that she had not been sexually molested," only later changing her story.6°
Although the culture defense did not completely negate the allegation
against Moua, it did lead to a plea bargain that mitigated his
61punishment.
54. Deirdre Evans-Prichard & Alison Dundes Renteln, The Interpretation and
Distortion of Culture: A Hmong "Marriage by Capture" Case in Fresno, California, 4 S.
CAL. INTERDISC. L.J. 1, 9 (1994).
55. Id.
56. Id. at 8.
57. Goldstein, supra note 14, at 150 n.97 ("In the Moua case, the tribesman could have
made an honest mistake concerning the woman's consent, and it would have been reasonable
for him to believe that her resistance was a mere pretense," referring to the possibility of a
mistake of fact defense to the charge of rape).
58. Evans-Pritchard & Renteln, supra note 54, at 31.
59. Goldstein, supra note 14, at 150.
60. Cynthia Lee, Interest Convergence Theory and the Cultural Defense, 49 ARIZONA
LAW REVIEW (forthcoming Winter 2007), available at http://ssm.conabstract=968754.
61. Evans-Pritchard & Renteln, supra note 54, at 26-28.
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C. People v. Chen
Homicide offers the most difficult context for the culture defense.
While some would accept the outcomes for Kargar and Moua, it is
difficult to justify a killer evading punishment, either completely or even
with diminished sanctions.
Goldstein relates the circumstances of People v. Chen,62 a 1989
case in which Dong Lu Chen, after learning that his wife had had an
affair, "left the room, returned with a claw hammer, knocked her onto
the bed, and hit her on the head eight times until she was dead.,
63
Again, the culture defense was successfully invoked to reduce Chen's
punishment. Instead of a conviction for second-degree murder, he
received five years probation, the lightest sentence possible for second-
degree manslaughter.64
The court accepted evidence, offered by an anthropologist serving
as an expert witness, concerning the cultural appropriateness of Chen's
reaction after becoming aware of his wife's infidelity.65 The episode
resulted in a death because, unlike what typically occurs in China, the
community failed to intervene to prevent the tragic outcome.6 6 The
dysfunctional element, therefore, was not Chen's outburst-which in
fact conformed to the cultural "script"-but rather the dissociation of the
Chens from a culture in which other Chinese would have played their
own parts in this tragic drama.
These three examples map the range of beneficial outcomes that
can occur from the use of the culture defense, from complete acquittal to
punishment mitigation. They also provide some sense of the contexts in
which an appeal to this kind of evidence would be prototypically
meaningful: new immigrants committing acts that reflect identification
with their former culture group. These litigated cases form the core of
the issues meant to be redressed by the standard availability of a culture
defense.
62. People v. Dong Lu Chen, No. 87-7774 (N.Y. Sup. Ct. Mar. 21, 1989).
63. Goldstein, supra note 14, at 151.
64. Id. at 151-52.
65. Id. at 151.
66. Id.
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IV. ADDRESSING THE OBJECTIONS
The proposal to recognize formally a culture defense has not been
universally welcomed.67  One constitutional concern is that "the
admission of cultural evidence violates the principle of equal protection
and favors immigrant and minority defendants over American
defendants."68
Legal anthropologists can assist the debate by demonstrating that
many legal standards are not self-evident, but culturally specific, as
Renteln suggests, and by addressing some of the most pointed objections
to this rule of evidence. Damian Sikora conveniently describes some of
the objections preventing recognition of the culture defense: "cultural
defenses may promote stereotypes; immigrant women and children's
rights are undermined by the defense; it would be impossible to draft
legislation that defines when, where, and how the defense can be used;
and the defense would cause a balkanization of the criminal justice
system. '69 Our discussion limits itself to the question of whether the
boundaries of the defense could be rationally identified and applied, and
whether its acceptance would indeed lead to a "balkanization of the
criminal justice system."
The predominant fear underlying these concerns is that chaos will
result if criminal law were to recognize a defendant's individual cultural
imperatives when assigning guilt or meting punishment.70 Social order
requires certain behavioral standards that generally apply equally to all.7 '
Deviation from that expectation creates unending difficulty for law
enforcement. If the basis for a punishable act becomes not the nature of
the act itself, but instead the personal history of the actor, then it cannot
67. See, e.g., Leti Volpp, (Mis)Identifying Culture: Asian Women and the Cultural
Defense, 17 HARV. WOMEN'S L.J. 57 (1994); Martin P. Golding, The Cultural Defense, 15
RATIO JURIS 146 (2002).
68. Lee, supra note 60, at 2.
69. Damian W. Sikora, Differing Cultures, Differing Culpabilities?: A Sensible
Alternative: Using Cultural Circumstances as a Mitigating Factor in Sentencing, 62 OHIO ST.
L.J. 1695, 1708 (2001).
70. This concern was expressed nicely, although in another context, by United States v.
Moylan, 417 F.2d 1002, 1009 (4th Cir. 1969) ("To encourage individuals to make their own
determinations as to which laws they will obey and which they will permit themselves as a
matter of conscience to disobey is to invite chaos.").
71. Note, The Cultural Defense in the Criminal Law, 99 HARV. L. REV. 1293, 1302
(1986) ("To maintain [social] order, it has been argued, societies must lay down a body of
positive law that compels the obedience of all regardless of individual notions of morality: if
each person were required to adhere to the law only to the extent that it was consistent with
her own values, societies would tend toward anarchy.").
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be easily discerned when state intervention is appropriate. Even more
troubling is the likelihood that individuals will perceive unfair
differences in treatment by state power. Why should I be severely
punished for attacking my wife, but someone else not, when the
principal difference between our two cases is that I acted out of personal
delinquency while the second defendant modeled a cultural norm? Is
not spousal abuse just as bad, and worth preventing and punishing,
whatever the circumstances? Surely migrating from another culture
should not be a sufficient excuse for acts criminalized in the new setting:
Look, everyone must modify their culture in this regard. Everyone is having to
develop new forms of self-control, which are at odds with the way they have
been socialized. Why should society give the members of this culture a special
exemption from a painful process that every culture in this society should
undergo?
7 2
Few argue that persistent, unwarranted, disparate treatment of
defendants charged with identical crimes would be healthy for any
system purported to be grounded in a respect for fundamental fairness
and justice within the rule of law. The challenge, then, is to recognize
the stubborn social fact that culture is a powerful motivator of human
action for which no one should be needlessly disadvantaged, while also
preventing any consequences of such considerations from undermining
the bonds of social cohesion and respect for the legal process. The
problem is determining to whom the culture defense should be available
and in which contexts the consideration of nonmajority cultural
influences advances both the quest for criminal justice and the respect
for an individual's right to culture and a preferred way of life. The key
to striking the proper balance between these competing interests lies in
the implications of the culture concept embedded in the justification for
the defense itself.
V. THE CULTURE CONCEPT
As its name suggests, the culture defense relies heavily upon the
basic anthropological idea of co-existing distinctive cultures. While the
content of the term "culture defense" has varied over the years,73 with
72. Jeremy Waldron, One Law for All? The Logic of Accommodation, 59 WASH. & LEE
L. REV. 3, 29 (2002) (emphasis in original).
73. Even a half century ago the term had acquired a plethora of distinct usages. For a
compilation of these usages, see ALFRED KROEBER & CLYDE KLUCKHOHN, CULTURE: A
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some anthropologists even having called for the abandonment of the
concept,74 the core sense required here is that of a patterned and deep
relationship between the beliefs and ideas of the individual and the
milieu in which he has lived. This tight relationship can be illustrated by
the following passage from Robert Levy's Tahitians: Mind and
Experience in the Society Islands:
In part, being a Tahitian is having a "Tahitian mind," operating with
assumptions and motives which have been shaped by various aspects of
growing up and of everyday life in Tahitian communities. People act in a
Tahitian way and "conform" to Tahitian culture because it is the natural thing
for them to do.
75
Culture provides a template of default ways for one's behavior to be
within a wide assortment of social and existential contexts. Culture is
not wholly determinative, but it does provide ready-made solutions to
the most commonly encountered problems of living, and especially of
group living.76 To deviate from such assumptions requires "work" of a
personal and anxiety-provoking sort, mainly due to the gap between
rejection of the group model and the convinced formulation of the
idiosyncratic solution (or, alternatively, the adoption of the prefabricated
cultural set of a new society).77 Few people are likely to reject more
than a small slice of the cultural traits they have acquired during early
childhood. While all humans live in a culture, it is the culture in which a
person was born and nurtured that has the most powerful formative
influence, in both breadth of areas of life impacted and the depth of
personality structures involved.78
CRITICAL REVIEW OF CONCEPTS AND DEFINITIONS (1952). The situation since has only
grown still more confused.
74. See, e.g., VICTOR DE MUNCK, CULTURE, SELF, AND MEANING 29 (2000).
75. ROBERT I. LEVY, TAHITIANS: MIND AND EXPERIENCE IN THE SOCIETY ISLANDS
326(1973).
76. See, e.g., Michelle Z. Rosaldo, Toward an Anthropology of Self and Feeling, in
CULTURE THEORY: ESSAYS ON MIND, SELF, AND EMOTION 137, 140 (Richard A. Shweder &
Robert A. LeVine eds., 1984) ("[Culture provides] a basis for the organization of activities,
responses, perceptions, and experiences by the conscious self.").
77. A common mode of this experience takes the form of "culture shock" when the
"sojourner" enters a new cultural setting and undergoes a "removal or distortion of many of
the familiar cues one encounters at home and the substitution for them of other cues that are
strange." EDWARD T. HALL, THE SILENT LANGUAGE 156 (1959).
78. The consequence of the processes of socialization is that children come to view
these traits as "supremely 'natural."' Uichol Kim & Soo-Hyang Choi, Individualism,
Collectivism, and Child Development: A Korean Perspective, in CROSS-CULTURAL ROOTS OF
MINORITY CHILD DEVELOPMENT 227, 228 (Patricia M. Greenfield & Rodney R. Cocking
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The difficult theoretical question concerns the details of how this
person-culture bond is forged. This process, known as enculturation,
has been characterized by Melford Spiro: "To learn a culture is to
acquire its propositions; to become enculturated is, in addition, to
'internalize' them as personal beliefs, that is, as propositions that are
thought to be true, proper, or right., 79  This internalization is so
pervasive that even "the most deliberately unconventional person is
unable to escape his culture to any significant degree., 80 Even an act of
rebellion can only be seen as such against the particular background to
which the behavior is responding. Within this perspective, cultural
psychologists argue that culture emerges as the core of the individual's
identity to such an extent that it is inextricable from that identity and
sense of self. According to Richard Shweder, for example, culture and
psyche are mutually constituting.81 Neither exists independently of the
other. Culture is inseparable from the individual, providing "the media
for 'how to be' and for how to participate as a member in good standing
of particular social contexts. 82
De Munck and others have suggested that the "self 'exists' as a
mental representation or construct, a language game, a constellation of
narratives that humans tell themselves .... [and that] the ontology of the
self (the 'realness' that we attribute to the self) is grounded in language
rather than in spirit-stuff or flesh and blood. 83 In an important sense,
then, culture creates language and language creates self, with reciprocal
influences at every level. This chain of relationships suggests that while
newcomers to a society are fully capable of adapting to the social and
legal milieu, adopting interpretations of their selves that incorporate the
in situ behavioral norms, this task will be especially difficult for
monolingual immigrants.84 Because they do not participate in the
eds., 1994).
79. Melford E. Spiro, Some Reflections on Cultural Determinism and Relativism with
Special Reference to Emotion and Reason, in CULTURE THEORY: ESSAYS ON MIND, SELF,
AND EMOTION 323, 326 (Richard A. Shweder & Robert A. LeVine, eds., 1984).
80. RALPH LINTON, THE TREE OF CULTURE 39 (1961).
81. Richard A. Shweder, Cultural Psychology: What is It?, in CULTURAL
PSYCHOLOGY: ESSAYS ON COMPARATIVE HUMAN DEVELOPMENT 1, 22 (James W. Stigler,
Richard A. Shweder, & Gilbert Herdt eds., 1990) ("[T]he central theme of cultural psychology
[is that] you can't take the stuff out of the psyche and you can't take the psyche out of the
stuff.").
82. URS FUHRER, CULTIVATING MINDS: IDENTITY AS MEANING-MAKING PRACTICE
82(2003).
83. DE MUNCK, supra note 74, at 39-40.
84. The convergence theory of intercultural communication holds that "if two or more
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"language game" of the new environment, monolingual immigrants face
additional obstacles in reconstructing a sense of self that contains the
new expectations and cultural assumptions built into the legal system.
85
The behaviors they will seek to observe will be those intended to
preserve the self-constructed, out-of-cultural rules from the previous
environment. "The worlds in which different societies live are distinct
worlds, not merely the same world with different labels attached., 86
Bridging the divide becomes even more onerous if postmodem
views of culture are applied. While agreeing that constructions of the
self can be approached as "language games," students of postmodernism
disagree with the assumption that these build upon a recognizable set of
human universals that both effectively limit the range of variation that
might develop in any context, and simultaneously ensure at least a
rudimentary consistency between human social groups.87  The
postmodern strains within cultural anthropology emphasize the
particular over the general-arguing, for example, that the basic
emotions which we assume are shared by all peoples (e.g., anger, love,
sadness) are in reality cultural constructs not available to all. 88  The
extent to which postmodem ideologies have left a permanent mark on
culture theories in anthropology remains to be seen, 89 but any tendency
individuals share information with one another, then over time they will tend to converge
toward one another, leading to a state of greater uniformity." D. Lawrence Kincaid, The
Convergence Theory and Intercultural Communication, in THEORIES IN INTERCULTURAL
COMMUNICATION 280, 282 (Young Yun Kim & William B. Gudykunst eds., 1988).
85. Id. at 290 ("If communication between members of an immigrant cultural group and
the host culture is unrestricted, then over time, the values of the immigrant group and the host
culture will converge toward a state of greater uniformity."). In contexts of linguistic
divergence between immigrants and the host country, those members of the immigrant group
who do not speak the language of the host culture (i.e., monolinguals), experience obstacles to
cultural convergence and thereby the incorporation of the new normative rules into their sense
of selves.
86. Edward Sapir, The Status of Linguistics as a Science, 5 LANGUAGE 207, 209
(1929); see also James M. Donovan & Brian A. Rundle, Psychic Unity Constraints upon
Successful Cross-Cultural Communication, 17 LANGUAGE & COMMUNICATION 219, 233
(1997) ("The very quality which makes any communication at all possible, psychic unity,
guarantees that successful communication will vary on a continuum from the universally
understandable to the solipsistically incommunicable.").
87. Representative of this position is Richard Shweder's pronouncement of a "cultural
psychology" that "does not presume the premise of psychic unity [or] that the fundamentals of
the mental life are by nature fixed, universal, abstract, and interior," but is instead sui generis
to the "intentional world" of each individual. Shweder, supra note 81, at 22.
88. DE MUNCK, supra note 74, at 46. The example of romantic love is developed at
length in James M. Donovan, Rock-Salting the Slippery Slope: Why Same-Sex Marriage is
Not a Commitment to Polygamous Marriage, 29 N. KY. L. REV. 521 (2002).
89. But see ADAM KUPER, CULTURE: THE ANTHROPOLOGISTS' ACCOUNT 223 (1999).
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in that direction can only serve to underscore further the difficulty of
relocating from one cultural context to another. Within more traditional
approaches to the culture concept, the challenge of such transpositions is
serious; under recent attempts at reformulation, it is Herculean. By any
reading, a need for sensitivity to the cultural assumptions of the
defendant in a criminal proceeding can be justified.
This intimate relationship between culture and personal identity
notwithstanding, it would be a mistake to attribute every act of a person
to her "culture." As described above, enculturation refers to the
internalization of the normative values of the group. Culture, while
arguably the most influential, is not the only constituent of individual
identity. Spiro names experience as another crucial element.90 Some
motivations, consequently, are grounded in idiosyncratic histories rather
than inherited cultural values. The culture defense would look to the
latter while excluding the former. It would be the task of the
anthropologist as expert witness to help the court draw that line in a
principled manner.
This concept of culture, while obviously incomplete, serves as the
foundation of our argument for allowing introduction of the culture
defense in court proceedings.
VI. Two LIMITATIONS UPON THE CULTURE DEFENSE
In a multicultural society, cultural difference must be respected, even fostered
.... All this is, of course, part of a certain liberal European tradition, but it
inevitably raises a problem for another liberal political tradition, dominant in
America, that is based on the principle that all citizens are equal-and the
same-before the law. [Scholars have] attempted to find some basis for
reconciling these two liberal traditions, but it is an intractable task.
91
Here, Kuper identifies a tension between the twin liberal beliefs
that all persons are equivalent before the law, and that personal
differences should be respected by the state. The first belief supports an
expectation that all defendants will be treated equally by the judicial
system, while the second belief justifies treating defendants individually
relative to their backgrounds, in order to achieve a uniform respect for
each one's dignity and rights. Both beliefs implicate the value of
equality, but different kinds of equality. Equality before the law seeks to
90. Spiro, supra note 79, at 324.
91. KUPER, supra note 89, at 236.
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respect the worthiness of the generic person, with no special allowances
made for any acquired attributes, such as wealth, status, or fame.92
Every person is subject to the same rules and standards that have been
promulgated beforehand. The consistency of procedural justice is the
guarantor of this kind of equality.
93
The second tenet of equality, however, responds to a different
concern, and is in many ways the converse of the first kind. Instead of
ignoring personal attributes in order to apply a uniform procedure, here
the goal is to recognize those individual differences in order to ensure
the fundamental fairness of proceedings. Legal proceedings would
otherwise be marred by any insensitively strict adherence to a
preordained set of rules. For example, the financially impoverished are
often assigned representation that would not otherwise be available to
them; and speakers of foreign languages may be given access to
interpreters. 94  The American society has an established history of
granting exemptions from general rules and laws to minority convictions
of conscience, whenever doing so does not threaten the public interests
(e.g., exempting the Amish from compulsory education laws, 95
exempting Jehovah's Witnesses from mandatory recitations of the
Pledge of Allegiance,96 and allowing Jews in the military to wear
yarmulkes). 97 The legal system, therefore, does not require conformity
merely for conformity's own sake. The system traditionally allows
92. See Schor, supra note 41, at 1330.
93. "Procedural justice has been defined as 'the right to treatment as an equal. That is
the right, not to an equal distribution of some good or opportunity, but to equal concern and
respect in the political decisions about how these goods and opportunities are to be
distributed."' Lawrence B. Solum, Procedural Justice, 78 S. CAL. L. REV. 181, 287 (2004)
(quoting Jeffrey Rachlinski, Perceptions of Fairness in Environmental Regulation, in
STRATEGIES FOR ENVIRONMENTAL ENFORCEMENT 339, 347 (Barton H. Thompson Jr. ed.,
1995)).
94. Franklyn P. Salimbene, Court Interpereters: Standards of Practice and Standards
for Training, 6 CORNELL J. L. & PUB. POL'Y 645, 647 (1997) ("To protect the constitutional
rights at trial of this increasing number of non-English speakers, one common
recommendation of the various state court bias reports has been to require the appointment of
language interpreters in judicial proceedings."); see, e.g., State v. Teshome, 94 P.3d 1004,
1006 (Wash. Ct. App. 2004) ("In Washington, a defendant's right to an interpreter is based on
the Sixth Amendment constitutional right to confront witnesses and the right inherent in a fair
trial to be present at one's own trial." (internal quotation marks omitted)).
95. Wisconsin v. Yoder, 406 U.S. 205 (1972).
96. W. Va. State Bd. of Educ. v. Barnette, 319 U.S. 624 (1943).
97. 10 U.S.C. § 774 (2000) (superseding Goldman v. Weinberger, 475 U.S. 503 (1986)
(holding that the First Amendment did not prohibit application of air force regulation
proscribing plaintiff's wearing of yarmulke while on duty and in uniform).
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deviations that are meaningful to small groups, so long as such
deviations are not overly costly to the interests of social order.
The three illustrative cases recounted earlier suggest that
consideration of culture during criminal proceedings is another example
of the exemption that the legal system sometimes will allow.98 To
preserve the balance of social order against the tension of the two
competing interests for equality, however, some limits on the culture
defense must be imposed. Even the permission granted by Congress to
Jews for the innocuous practice of wearing a cap is bounded by
limitations: it may be prohibited whenever "the Secretary determines
that the wearing of the item would interfere with the performance of the
member's military duties; or (2) if the Secretary determines ... that the
item of apparel is not neat and conservative." 99 In the context of military
apparel, the goal is to strike a balance between respecting the important
cultural backgrounds of military personnel, versus the need to maintain
sufficient discipline and conformity required for the unit to perform its
intended function. No less can be expected of an allowed culture
defense, in which case the task is to articulate principled limitations that
recognize the embedded values of respect for an individual person's
cultural background and equality before the law.
Our suggestion finds reasonable limitations in each of two major
dimensions of the culture defense: the people who can invoke it, and the
contexts in which it can be invoked. The goal is to construct a
principled understanding of the culture defense that prevents defendants
from minority cultures from being unjustly disadvantaged in their
interactions with the judicial system, while allaying a fear that allowing
such defenses would lead to an outbreak of every man becoming his own
standard of law, and thus to the disintegration of social order and a
return to a Hobbesian state of nature.
98. The fact that all three of these examples are religious exercise cases complicates
their immediate translation into precedents for culture defense arguments. See supra note 48.
Their role here in our argument, therefore, is merely to indicate that our legal practices have
proven tolerant of exceptions that have been specific, targeted, and limited, without chaos
ensuing. We have no reason to believe that similarly narrow allowances would cause any
greater harm to the rule of law than these have proven to be.
99. 10 U.S.C. § 774(b) (2000).
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A. To what crimes should a defendant be allowed to apply the culture
defense ?
The problem that the culture defense aims to address is not new; it
has confronted all heterogeneous political societies. Whenever one
group expands to incorporate significantly different peoples, the
question of how the disparate populations should be governed becomes
central. One obvious solution-enforced conformity by all people via
the legal institutions of the controlling group-is not always available
for several reasons, especially the apparent injustice of the strategy.
First, the dominant culture may not believe the subordinated people are
sufficiently "elevated" or "civilized" to learn and comply with the subtle
intricacies of its law. Even more likely, the groups to be governed are
simply too many, too diverse, too dispersed, and ruled by too few to
make imposition of a radically different set of legal expectations an
effective option. In such circumstances, a more efficient solution may
be to let the conquered conduct their daily affairs according to their
traditional practices, and only apply foreign law to matters that directly
impact the interests of the alien governors. Yet, even if the dominant
power allows subordinate groups to maintain their local practices for
most matters, the difficult issue remains over when the parties-whether
two individuals in a private dispute, or one person in conflict with the
civil authorities--do not share the same legal background. What law
applies?
Romans-members of the original Western multicultural society-
recognized that each jurisdiction had its own ius civile, or civil laws,
with specific requirements that might have been unfamiliar to a visiting
foreigner.'00 Because Roman citizenship was as much a status symbol
as a status, their own "civil law [i.e., the law of citizens] was the proud
possession of Roman citizens and could not be extended
indiscriminately to peregrines [foreigners]."' 0'1 The ius civile thus
formally applied only to Roman citizens, 10 2 and that citizenship would
not be extended to all free members of the Roman Empire until 212.1°3
This history underscores the extended period for which problems arising
100. Dante Scala, Introduction to HENRY SUMNER MAINE, ANCIENT LAW, at vii, xxvi
(2001) ("All nations who are ruled by laws and customs, are governed partly by their own
particular laws, and partly by those laws which are common to all mankind. The law which a
people enacts is called the Civil Law of that people.").
i01. PETER STEIN, ROMAN LAW IN EUROPEAN HISTORY 12 (1999).
102. See OLGA TELLEGEN-COUPERUS, A SHORT HISTORY OF ROMAN LAW 48 (1993).
103. Id. at 67.
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from the intersection of legal systems and multiculturalism would vex
the Empire.
Exclusion from the civil law, however, did not mean that aliens
were permitted free license in their actions. While not
"indiscriminately" subject to the ius civile, all persons were answerable
to the ius gentium, or the law of nations.'04 This body of rules included
those that Romans believed were not locale-specific, but could instead
be discerned by rational beings, regardless of where such persons had
established societies. 0 5 In a certain light, then, when faced with the
growing multiculturalism of their expanding empire, the Romans
allowed a kind of culture defense for matters that were solely the
concern of the civil law, but not for those that fell within the universal
law of nations.
Could we adopt a similar approach to the conflicts arising from our
own multicultural society, a solution that identifies one coherent body of
law in which the culture defense is available and another in which it is
not? We are skeptical that the Roman solution would prove transferable
in any of its specifics. One difficulty in attempting to identify a
principled divide between two bodies of law corresponding to the
Roman ius civile and ius gentium is the sheer quantity of law that now
exists as compared to that with which the Romans were acquainted.
Justinian's compilation of Roman law, the Corpus luris Civilis from the
Sixth Century, was contained in a few volumes; all three parts-the
Institutes, the Codex, and the Digest-in modern editions consume
approximately 2800 pages. By contrast, the base set of the unannotated
official U.S. Code-last published in 2000-without accounting for
supplements, federal regulations, or state and local laws, requires thirty-
five volumes. Excusing foreigners from the details of civil law seemed
more feasible when that law regulated comparatively little of everyday
life. With the steadily pervasive insertion of governmental oversight
into more and more of ordinary living, the practical consequences of
nonconformity become more serious, reducing the possibility of
anything approaching a blanket culture exemption.
Beyond sheer volume, a more pertinent limitation of any direct
appeal to the Roman example of the culture defense follows from the
kinds of laws at issue. U.S. law is not merely more voluminous, it also
104. STEIN, supra note 101, at 13 ("The ius gentium was available to citizens and non-
citizens alike.").
105. Id. ("[The rules of the ius gentium] were based not on traditional practice but on the
common sense or 'natural reason,' which all men shared as part of their human nature.").
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concerns significantly more public law than did Roman law. 1 6 As a
broad generalization, Romans viewed most disputes as arising between
individuals, and only rarely as involving the state's police action against
a person. 107 In general the "administration of justice was not organized
by the state," whose function was limited primarily to the compilation of
"an official list of Roman citizens who could in specific cases be
appointed by the praetor as judges." 108  The ius civile thus "became
synonymous with private law."'1 9  Romans originally understood the
private/public distinction as abstractly demarking "those civil law rules
which could not be altered by private agreement, by contrast with those
that could be altered by parties." This distinction was first drawn by the
jurist Ulpian" to refer to "law that was primarily of public concern,
such as the powers of magistrates and the state religion, by contrast with
the law that concerned the interests of private individuals.""' It appears
the Romans felt that exempting foreigners from the full requirements of
private civil law was tolerable, but the social consequences of a similar
freedom from the regulatory influence of public law would be much
more disruptive.
Although the Roman solution cannot serve as a model for our
adoption, the example is still instructive in its demonstration of the
persistent problems legal authorities face from multiculturalism. The
Romans found the tension important enough to craft an enduring
solution that suited their overall approach to jurisprudence (out of their
construction of the pragmatic ius gentium would come the philosophical
category of the ius naturale, or natural law, an intellectual legacy we still
carry). The challenge of governing a multicultural society should
demand similar attention and respect from modern jurists.
106. The Twelve Tables, the original source of Roman law, included no public law at all,
thus creating "the fundamental distinction between public law and private law." ALAN
WATSON, THE SPIRIT OF THE ROMAN LAW 37-38 (1995). Even within the realm of private
law there was a marked lack of a public dimension. Id. at 46.
107. Id. at 46 ("Public law is that which regards the state of Rome." (quoting
JUSTINIAN'S DIGEST 1.1.4)). On public law the Justinian's Digest "says nothing beyond
mentioning public property and again the detail on the ownership of treasure found on state
land." Id.
108. TELLEGEN-COUPERU, supra note 102, at 58.
109. STEIN, supra note 101, at 13.
110. Domitius Ulpianus, anglicized as Ulpian, was a Roman jurist of Tyrian ancestry.
The time and place of his birth are unknown, but the period of his literary activity was
between 211 and 222 AD; he died 228 AD. TONY HONORJ , ULPIAN 8-15 (1982).
111. Id.at2l.
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If we cannot adopt Roman law's restriction of the culture defense to
civil law issues alone, is there another way to draw a principled line as to
the kinds of laws that should recognize it? The critics' concerns are not
unwarranted: Renteln's exhaustive survey documents the assortment of
cases in which cultural evidence has been invoked, including homicide,
sexual abuse of varying degrees, drug use, animal cruelty, death, and
marriage. 1 2 If the objection to the culture defense is to be met, a
standard is required that will control the opportunities for its invocation
and thus allay fears that permitting the defense would be tantamount to
inviting social disintegration.
A plausible solution would seek not to impose arbitrary limitations,
but would better identify limitations within the rationale for the defense
itself. One approach to this challenge, therefore, draws upon the concept
of culture that is assumed by the defense. In the description of the
culture concept that we offered earlier, cultural norms generally further
group living." 3  Purely idiosyncratic notions, such as personal
experience, would have their roots elsewhere. The culture defense seeks
to provide a mechanism for the court to consider the former, not the
latter: Chen murdered his wife not solely because of his personal anger,
but because his wife's adultery was viewed as a shame to his ancestors,
as well as himself and his children." 14 This shame was so harrowing that
it became his duty to his ancestry, self, and progeny to remove the
tarnish by attempting to kill the adulteress.
Within this framework, the culture defense should be limited to acts
that have embedded within them the interests of the social group rather
than those of the individual person. A sustainable dividing line could
conceivably be drawn not between private and public law, or the ius
civile and ius gentium, but between those acts performed for the purpose
of cultivating and preserving socially valued relationships, versus those
which are merely attempts at self-enrichment and personal advantage.
Accordingly, crimes involving theft, armed or unarmed robbery, and
other presumptively self-beneficial economic crimes would fall outside
the scope of a properly delimited culture defense, as compared to crimes
involving domestic relations. Fear of our police due to past experiences
in a natal culture wherein police forces were viewed not as protectors of
the citizens but as agents of oppression, such as the Gestapo, would not
112. See, e.g., infra Appendix.
113. See supra Part V.
114. See supra Part II.C.
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trigger the culture defense, 15 while facts involving family arrangements
may deserve consideration of a defendant's culture.
This simple limitation would prevent the culture defense from
becoming the carte blanche for criminality feared by some skeptics, and
would recast several elements of Renteln's culture defense test. Perhaps
tightening the terms of the first prong in Renteln's test, we argue that the
defendant should come from the cultural background argued to impose
the claimed duty, rather than be merely associated with a more diffuse
ethnicity. Our version of the second prong in Renteln's test is also more
limited: the relevant society must not only have a "tradition" related to
the act, but that tradition must be a positive one ordinarily functioning to
regulate affirmative and desirable social cohesion. Under this analysis,
for example, Cynthia Lee's inclusion of "Black Rage" within her
instances of the culture defense inappropriately expands the category. 16
Defendants should lose access to the culture defense if they cannot
demonstrate that they relied upon the normative practices of their
specific culture, rather than upon personal or non-normative
interpretations of those standards. 17  Addressing these issues would
require an anthropologist or other culture expert to serve as an expert
witness, and to articulate which norms are demanded of the defendant's
home culture versus norms that are merely preferred but rarely observed
(or perhaps formerly required but today obsolete). In any situation but
the first, the culture defense should be insupportable.
B. To whom should the culture defense be available?
In addition to restricting invocations of the culture defense to those
acts that have a foundation in the original cultural background of the
defendant, and in the positive group orientation of its normative systems,
an independent dimension of limitation should be found in the intentions
of the actor. As reviewed earlier, conviction of criminal charges in the
115. See United States v. Zapata, 997 F.2d 751 (10th Cir. 1993).
116. Lee, supra note 60, at 52-55.
117. The requirement that the invoked cultural tradition rely upon shared, normative
practices within the referent group distinguishes the culture defense from another species of
legal exceptionalism, religion. Religious beliefs can be wholly idiosyncratic, deviating from
the understandings of other members of the same congregation, without weakening the force
of the claimed religious exemption. See Thomas v. Review Bd. of Ind. Employment Sec.
Div., 450 U.S. 707, 715-16 (1981) ("[T]he guarantee of free exercise is not limited to beliefs
which are shared by all of the members of a religious sect."). Private beliefs about social
duties find no place in the culture defense.
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American legal system often requires proof of the defendant's mens rea
when committing the deed." 8 In its most general sense, this term of art
refers to the state of mind of the person committing the crime: he had to
intend "purposely" or "knowingly" the consequences of the act, which
extends to recognition of the act's criminal aspect.' 19
While a culture defense pleader might have intended the charged
act, the defendant may not necessarily have also intended the crime, and
thus may lack the element of culpability often required. This does not
constitute a mere "ignorance of the law" scenario, however, because the
defendant will have acted not merely in ignorance of the criminality of
the act in this jurisdiction, but also in the reasonable belief of its
normativity in the culture of upbringing. Kargar, for example, surely
intended to kiss the penis of his infant son, but he did not thereby intend
to break the law; on the contrary, he saw himself as acting in accord with
the established customs of showing respect to an infant son.1 20 A useful
distinction can therefore be drawn between someone who inadvertently
commits a "crime" by observing a normative standard that he has been
taught is expected of "a member in good standing" of his reference
group, and someone who performs the same deed, but does so
maliciously and in full knowledge of the act's criminal status within the
local culture's legal system. While this latter person satisfies the mens
rea requirement, the former arguably does not-this was the conclusion
of the court in Moua.'
12
In practice, this framework allows the construction of a graded
series of rebuttable presumptions about the defendant's probable
mindset. At one extreme, a newly arrived immigrant from a markedly
different culture who has been charged with performing a deed that is
normative and valued in the home context, but criminal in the new one,
may be presumed to have acted without the requisite guilty mind. The
culture defense works best in this scenario. A recent immigrant could
probably put forth a better rationale for asserting the culture defense
than, for example, a third-generation descendant.' 22 Barring the most
118. See supra Part II.
119. See supra Part I.
120. See supra Part lII.A.
121. See supra Part I].B.
122. The presiding judge in Chen's trial reasoned similarly: "'Were this crime committed
by the defendant as someone who was born and raised in America, or born elsewhere but
primarily raised in America, even in the Chinese American community, the [c]ourt would
have been constrained to find the defendant guilty of manslaughter in the first degree"' rather
than in the second degree. See Volpp, supra note 67, at 73 (quoting Transcript of Record at
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unusual conditions of social deprivation, a person whose family has
lived in the United States for a generation or two would have been
heavily steeped in the normative and legal expectations of the dominant
society, and thus could be presumed to be aware of how his actions will
appear to persons outside his cultural milieu, even if he felt justified, for
cultural reasons, to ignore those rules. This person, in contrast to the
first, would possess the state of mind required of the charge, and thus
should be allowed a comparatively restricted use of the culture defense.
In addition to revising the first two of Renteln's culture test elements,
therefore, we would also add another: the litigant must have been
presumptively ignorant of the normative conventions his acts
transgressed.
VII. CONCLUSION
The culture defense appears sporadically in reported cases, invoked
as an erratic, uncertain line of argument that can be pivotal in one case
yet deemed irrelevant in the next.123 We support Renteln's position that
culture-based claims should be formally recognized as a legitimate
defense, making the culture defense available to all defendants as a
matter of standard practice rather than an uncertain option found in some
courts but not others. Renteln does not insist that these defenses should
always prevail, as other considerations (such as public policy) might
have higher priority in the court's decision-making process. 24 Still, the
301-02, People v. Dong Lu Chen, No. 87-7774 (N.Y. Sup. Ct. Mar. 21, 1989)).
123. Cynthia Lee argues that this seeming inconsistency of the judiciary's acceptance of
the culture defense masks a pattern. "[I]mmigrant and minority defendants who introduce
cultural evidence in their defense are more likely to succeed in mitigating a charge or sentence
when their interests are either similar to or coalesce with those of the dominant majority."
Lee, supra note 60, at 4-5. Chen's use of the defense in his provocation claim succeeded, she
reasons, less because of his immigrant status than "because his claim [wa]s familiar and
resonate[d] with the judge and jury." Id. at 37. Similarly, while it might have appeared that
the prosecutor gave undue weight to Moua's marriage-by-capture explanation, Lee suggests
that upwards of 96% of all criminal cases are resolved by such plea bargaining, and, therefore,
no special explanation is required. In both cases, she found the defendants were helped by the
fact that their cultural stories reinforced negative stereotypes about Asian men as "barbaric"
and "misogynistic" foreigners. Lee admits, however, that interest convergence does not
explain all successful assertions of the culture defense. Id. at 59.
124. For example, she would put beyond reach of the culture defense "traditions that
involve irreparable harm" as well as "forced marriages." RENTELN, supra note 5, at 218.
Renteln acknowledges that "no one analytic framework ... is capable of solving all rights
conflicts [and, therefore, that] the resolution of culture conflicts can only take place on a case-
by-case basis." Id.
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routine openness of the court to hearing these arguments could be
expected to effect cumulative changes that favor cultural diversity
among persons appearing before the bench, rendering greater fairness to
all.
A significant obstacle to this salutary result is the concern that no
principled boundaries could be imposed on such a defense, effectively
rendering each person sovereign over his or her own actions. The goal
of this essay has been to show that limits on the use of the defense can
be imposed, based not upon arbitrary rules, but upon the arguments
supporting the defense itself.
We offered the "reasonable man" standard as a relevant analogy to
begin our analysis. If this traditional tool of legal analysis is as freighted
with the presumptions of the majority culture as some commentators
suggest, the culture defense represents neither a "special" defense nor
the sort of legal exceptionalism feared by critics, but rather makes
available to cultural minorities the same presumption enjoyed by the
dominant population: to be judged by the standard of reasonableness
expected of a person in his or her situation, extending even to the
cultural presuppositions. On its face, then, the culture defense
introduces nothing alien or incompatible with the legal system as it
currently operates. A desire to preserve the inherent fairness of our
judicial system, therefore, requires some version of the culture defense.
In its barest terms, the culture defense argues that it is neither
criminal nor an illness to be a conscientious member of a different
cultural system. Maintaining social order requires neither pathologizing
nor criminalizing the motives behind the act; a legal system can remain
fair and stable while still providing for justification or mitigation under
pertinent facts relating to cultural influences. We proposed two
limitations to check this greater sensitivity to cultural backgrounds: 1)
the culture defense is best applied to acts that, in the original setting, are
understood to advance social rather than personal goals (a limitation on
the kinds of crimes to which the culture defense should be available);
and, 2) the defense addresses the mens rea element of the charge, and
thus is best justified with defendants who presumptively cannot have
known the criminal nature of the act they were committing (a limitation
on the types of persons to whom the culture defense would apply).
Incorporating these suggestions into Renteln's original culture
defense test, the following revised version would result:
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1. Is the litigant an enculturated member of the referenced group?
2. Does the group recognize the acknowledged tradition claimed by
the litigant?
3. Is that tradition expected to contribute to the fostering of positive
social bonds within the culture group?
4. Was the litigant influenced by that tradition when he or she
acted?
5. Were the circumstances of the litigant such that he or she could
be reasonably presumed to be unaware of the contrary normative
standards of the dominant society?
A principled use of the culture defense in any formulation will
require an increased reliance upon the kinds of specialized knowledge
available from cultural and legal anthropologists, among others. These
experts could offer the court helpful information concerning both the
issues of culture norms in other societies, as well as identifying
embedded assumptions within our own legal system that can present an
unintended disadvantage to the cultural minority. By "studying up, ' 125 a
term of art encouraging anthropologists to study their own cultures in
addition to traditional or "primitive" societies, legal anthropologists can
uncover hidden presuppositions within ostensibly unproblematic legal
claims, defenses, and rules within the American legal system. Wherever
the judicial process advertises itself as being fair to all, any "stacking of
the legal deck" that legal anthropologists uncover should provoke
remedial responses. That project necessitates the formal recognition of a
reasonable culture defense.
125. Laura Nader, Up the Anthropologist-Perspectives Gained from Studying Up, in
REINVENTING ANTHROPOLOGY 282,284 (Dell Hymes ed., 1972).
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APPENDIX
CULTURE CONFLICTS IN THE COURTROOM
A synopsis of representative cases collected in ALISON DUNDES
RENTELN, THE CULTURAL DEFENSE (2004)
Homicide - Excuse Defenses
Insanity
People v. Kimura, No. A-091133 (Los Angeles Super. Ct. 1985).
Defendant had attempted oyako-shinju (parent-child suicide), but only
children drowned. This practice is illegal but not unknown in Japan.
The homicide charge was reduced to voluntary manslaughter; the
defendant was found guilty and sentenced to one year in prison.
Automatism
People v. Wu, 286 Cal. Rptr. 868 (Cal. Ct. App. 1991). A Chinese
woman had strangled her son and then attempted suicide. The defense
argued that she had a cultural motivation to save her son and herself
from shame and abuse, and to be reunited in the afterlife. She was
convicted of voluntary manslaughter.
Battered Woman Defense
Nguyen v. State, 520 S.E.2d 907 (Ga. 1999). A woman from Vietnam
had shot her disrespectful husband and stepdaughter after she was
informed of his wish to divorce her. The Georgia Supreme Court held
that evidence regarding her cultural background was properly excluded
as it had no effect on her perception of imminent harm.
Culture-Bound Syndromes
State v. Ganal, 917 P.2d 370 (Haw. 1996). A Filipino man had shot his
relatives after "running amok" (a condition of great emotional
disturbance recognized in Southeast Asia and the Philippines), brought
on by humiliation over his failing marriage. His conviction of first-
degree murder was affirmed.
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Diminished Capacity
People v. Poddar, 518 P.2d 342 (Cal. 1972). A member of the Harijan
caste had killed a woman after she rejected his romantic advances. The
court excluded testimony about cultural stress of Indian students in his
caste (who are used to arranged marriages) attending American
universities. The conviction for second-degree murder was overturned
on unrelated grounds.
Provocation
See People v. Dong Lu Chen, No. 87-7774 (N.Y. Sup. Ct. Mar. 21,
1989), in discussion supra Part III.C.
People v. Aphaylath, 502 N.E.2d 998 (N.Y. App. 1986). A Laotian
refugee had stabbed his wife in a jealous rage. The court did not allow a
culture-based defense regarding culture shock and shame-related
infidelity. The defendant's conviction of second-degree murder was
overturned due to exclusion of culture shock testimony.
Homicide - Justification
Self-Defense
People v. Croy, 710 P.2d 392 (Cal. 1985). A Native American had
killed a police officer during a chase over a dispute in a liquor store.
The cultural argument was that defendant Croy, as a result of past
discriminations, had been conditioned not to trust white authorities. The
jury acquitted of all charges.
Homicide - Sentencing Mitigation
Death Penalty
Siripongs v. Calderon, 133 F.3d 732 (9th Cir. 1998). A Thai national
admited to being present at the robbery of a store, but denied killing two
clerks. After his conviction and death sentence was upheld, he argued
that his refusal to name accomplices was culturally motivated. The court
was skeptical because, according to the court, defendant Siripongs
seemed too Americanized. The defendant was executed in 1998.
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Children - Abuse Cases
Folk Medicine
In re Jertrude 0., 466 A.2d 885 (Md. Ct. Spec. App. 1983). Children of
Central African Republic parents were removed after "cupping"; the
appeals court reversed the finding that the oldest child should have been
taken from the parents.
Touching
See State v. Kargar, 679 A.2d 81 (Me. 1996), in discussion supra Part
III.A.
Krasniqi v. Dallas Cty. Child Protective Servs., 809 S.W.2d 927 (Tex.
App. 1991). An Albanian Muslim man had lost his parental rights after
accusations of sexual molestation of his four-year-old daughter. While
cultural testimony won acquittal in the criminal case, it proved irrelevant
to the custody battle: the two children were legally adopted by their
foster parents and forced to convert from Islam to Christianity.
Drugs - Illegal Substances
Khat
State v. Gurreh, 758 A.2d 877 (Conn. App. 2000). The court affirmed
the conviction for sale and possession of khat, after arguments that
defendant was not put on sufficient notice that law (which mentioned
active compounds only, and not khat) was interpreted as applying to the
chewed plant.
Medical Exemptions
United States v. Khang, 36 F.3d 77 (9th Cir 1994). Hmong brothers
were convicted of importing opium for medicinal use by their aged
father. Introducing false arguments that they did not know importation
for this use was a crime not only failed to benefit them, but provoked the
district court to raise their sentences for obstruction of justice.
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United States v. Vongsay, 988 F.2d 126 (9th Cir. 1993). A Thai woman
had been convicted of bringing 2200 grams of opium into the United
States that she had been asked to bring as gifts. The courts did not allow
her to introduce expert testimony about Mien culture explaining that a
request to deliver gifts for others is considered obligatory.
Fear of Police
United States v. Zapata, 997 F.2d 751 (10th Cir. 1993). A Mexican
man, due to his experiences of police in his homeland, did not feel free
to refuse a DEA officer's request to search him. The officer found
drugs. Although the lower court granted the motion to suppress the
physical evidence, the appeals court disagreed, saying that the objective




United States v. Tomono, 143 F.3d 1401 (1lth Cir. 1998). A Japanese
man was indicted for bringing prohibited species into the country. He
pleaded guilty and won a reduced sentence based upon "cultural
differences" regarding awareness of consequences of his actions. This




People v. Benu, 385 N.Y.S.2d 222 (N.Y. Crim. Ct. 1976). A father was
convicted of child endangerment for arranging the marriage of his
thirteen-year-old daughter, with her consent, to the seventeen-year-old
father of her unborn child. "Regardless of conformity or lack of
conformity to Moslem ritual, the fact is that Fatima was thirteen years
old at the time of marriage, and thus, the marriage was voidable." Id. at
142.
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Marriageability
Marks v. Clarke, 102 F.3d 1012 (9th Cir 1996). During an illegal
search, Spokane police officers had conducted body searches of
unmarried Rom girls, leaving them "polluted" or marime in the eyes of
the community. Initially the plaintiffs had sued for $19 million, but after
eleven years the family agreed to a $1.43 million settlement.
Capture
See Moua case in discussion supra Part III.B.
Polygamy
People v. Ezeonu, 588 N.Y.S.2d 116 (N.Y. Sup. Ct. 1992). A Nigerian
national was prosecuted for rape in the second degree of his second wife,
who was thirteen years old. The charge was defined as, "when, being
eighteen years old or more, he or she engages in sexual intercourse with
another person to whom the actor is not married less than fourteen years
old." Id. at 345. The defendant argued that because he was legally
married to the girl, he was innocent of the crime. Although the marriage
was valid in Nigeria, the court ruled that bigamy was no defense to the
charge of rape.
Temporary
In re Marriage of Vryonis, 248 Cal. Rptr. 807 (Cal. Ct. App. 1988). An
Iranian woman, after entering into a temporary marriage (mut'a), filed
for spousal support after the marriage failed. The man denied a marriage
existed. Although the trial court ruled that she had a good faith belief in
the validity of the marriage, the appeals court held that such belief was
not grounded on an objectively reasonable basis because the ceremony
lacked the usual indicia of marriage.
Divorce
In re Marriage of Weiss, 49 Cal. Rptr. 2d 339 (Cal. Ct. App. 1996). A
baptist former wife had written a commitment pledging to rear children
of the marriage in her former husband's Jewish faith. After the lower
court denied husband's request that wife be enjoined from engaging in
certain religious activity with the child, the appeals court held that the
wife's antenuptial promise to raise children in her husband's religion
was unenforceable.
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LOOC, Inc. v. Kohli, 701 A.2d 92 (Md. 1997). A Sikh man had been
denied a managerial position with Domino's Pizza because he refused to
shave his beard, an act that can lead to excommunication from his
community. The controversy began in 1987 with wins on both sides as
Domino's, known for the fundamentalist Christian beliefs of its founder,
refused reasonable accommodation.
Industry
Bhatia v. Chevron U.S.A, Inc., 734 F.2d 1382 (9th Cir. 1984). A Sikh
employee who was unable to wear an OSHA-required respirator due to
his beard had been suspended from his job and offered lower-paying
employment as a clerk and janitor. The court found that the employer
had made good-faith efforts to accommodate the plaintiff.
Courtroom
Close-it Enterprises, Inc. v. Weinberger, 407 N.Y.S.2d 587 (N.Y. App.
Div. 1978). In an action over sales commissions, the appellate court
overturned an earlier judgment for the plaintiff employer because the
judge had required defendant to remove his yarmulke. Rather than
comply, the defendant waited outside the courtroom for the duration of
the trial.
Schools
Menora v. Illinois High School Ass'n, 683 F.2d 1030 (7th Cir. 1982).
Jewish basketball players brought an action challenging a rule
forbidding players to wear headwear while playing. The appeals court
vacated the holding that the rule, as applied to prohibiting pinning on
with bobby pins of yarmulkes while playing basketball, violated the free
exercise clause of the First Amendment, and remanded the case to allow
the parties to come to a compromise.
Police
Marshall v. District of Columbia, 392 F. Supp. 1012 (D. D.C. 1975). An
officer who had been terminated for failure to comply with police
department grooming regulations brought suit. The D.C. District Court
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ruled that the regulations promoted the substantial governmental interest
of projecting an image facilitating effective functioning of the police
department, and was necessary to ensure the safety and security of
citizens. This interest outweighed the plaintiff's interest in maintaining
his hair and beard as his religious beliefs dictated.
Military
Goldman v. Weinberger, 472 U.S. 1016 (1985). An Air Force captain
who was an Orthodox Jew and rabbi was told not to wear his yarmulke
while in uniform. The U.S. Supreme Court deferred to the military
under the doctrine of military necessity after the appeals court reversed
the judgment enjoining enforcement of the Air Force regulation.
Prison
Robinson v. Foti, 527 F. Supp. 1111 (E.D. La. 1981). A Rastafari
inmate sued to prevent enforcement of prison haircut regulations. The
Louisiana District Court held that the inmate was not entitled to the
requested relief since the practice of wearing his hair in dreadlocks,
rather than cutting it, was not mandatory upon members of his sect.
The Deceased - Autopsies
Public Health
Yang v. Sturner, 750 F. Supp. 558 (D. R.I. 1990). A Hmong couple sued
Rhode Island's chief medical examiner due to the autopsy conducted on
their son's body without consent. After initially finding for the
plaintiffs, the judge withdrew the first opinion and entered another
holding that that application of a Rhode Island law governing autopsies
did not profoundly impair the religious freedom of the Hmongs.
Violent Accidental Death
Smialek v. Begay, 721 P.2d 1306 (N.M. 1986). A mother and siblings of
a decedent sued the state medical investigator under federal civil rights
statutes for damages resulting from an alleged wrongful autopsy. The
New Mexico Supreme Court, applying a Western understanding of
which individuals constitute "family," held that brothers and sisters lack
standing to assert an alleged violation of the free exercise of their
religious beliefs.
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The Deceased - Preparation of Bodies
Embalming
Doersching v. State Funeral Directors Board, 405 N.W.2d 781 (Wis. Ct.
App. 1987). The Funeral Directors Examining Board had revoked a
funeral director's license for failure to properly embalm a car accident
victim for an open casket funeral in Mexico. Although the court upheld
the revocation, the dissent disagreed with "[t]he board's conclusion that
Doersching's action exhibited a willful disrespect for the feelings and
welfare of the Rocha family." Id. 791 (Sundby, J., dissenting). Such a
finding imputes to Doersching a knowledge of Mexican culture, which
some would argue exceeds the responsibilities of the reasonable
professional.
Transportation
Onyeanusi v. Pan Am, 952 F.2d 788 (3d Cir. 1992). An action was
brought against the airline for mishandling human remains, including
initial confusion with another body, and eventual delivery in a burlap
bag, which has negative cultural meanings. The legal argument
concerned whether the body was a "person, goods, or baggage" under
the Warsaw Convention. The court determined that human remains are
"goods" and thus barred the plaintiff's complaint.
Burial
Lyng v. Northwest Indian Cemetery Protective Ass'n, 485 U.S. 439
(1988). The parties contested the Forest Service's plans to permit timber
harvesting and road construction in an area of national forest
traditionally used for religious purposes by members of three American
Indian tribes in northwestern California. The Supreme Court held that
the free exercise clause did not prohibit the government from permitting
timber harvesting and road construction in this area.
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